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One of the more ambiguous terms to have surfaced in recent law
of the sea negotiations is in reference to certain States as being
"geographically-disadvantaged." Few criteria have been spelled
out for inclusion in such groups, and the only serious suggestions
for distinguishing among degrees of disadvantage have been those
which tend to put land-locked States in a special category of mis-
fortune. For many years, the plight of the land-locked countries
has attracted international attention: witness the 1921 Barcelona
Convention, the provisions on their behalf in the 1958 Geneva High
Seas Convention, and the 1965 UNCTAD Convention on Transit
Trade of Land-locked States.' Their problems are by no means re-
solved, and the Informal Single Negotiating Text,2 which emerged
* Department of Geography, University of Rhode Island.
** The Geographer, U.S. Department of State. The views expressed are
those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the United States gov-
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1. See, e.g., M. GLASSNER, AccEsS TO THE SEA FOR DEVELOPING LAND-
LocKED STATES (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).
2. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/,WP.8 (1975).
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from the 1975 Geneva Session of the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, makes a number of provisions on their
behalf. But in addition to the land-locked States, there are an in-
definite number of coastal countries which, for various reasons,
claim or may be expected to claim, special rights in the new regime
of the oceans on the grounds of geographic disadvantage. It is with
the parameters of such a group that this paper is concerned.
The first category of States, other than the land-locked, to attract
notice in law of the sea negotiations, was the "shelf-locked" States,
those whose continental shelf abutted on the shelf or shelves of
neighbors, as in the North Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf.
Such States lack the advantages of a continental slope and rise,
and thus lack the prospects of hydrocarbon reserves on the outer
parts of the continental margin. But the shelf-locked countries-
some developed and some developing-have now been joined by
new categories of "geographically-disadvantaged States" (herein-
after referred to as GDS), with the result that a strong political
force is at work in law of the sea negotiations, seeking special rights
and privileges for what may turn out to be a substantial number
of countries.
3
In introducing the issue of the GDS, several points should be
noted. One is that "disadvantage" is more a relative than an abso-
lute concept. The 29 land-locked States have no direct access to
the sea, and in this sense have an "absolute" disadvantage with re-
spect to the 125 coastal States. But even among the land-lockeds
there are important differences; first, in levels of economic develop-
ment and second, in difficulties of securing and maintaining access
to the sea. Thus, some land-lockeds might be seen as "disadvan-
taged" with respect to others of the group.4 But if a country has
a limited coastline, a small extent of economic zone (given the ex-
tension seaward of national limits to a maximum of 200 miles), or
few resources therein, these conditions may seem inadequate
3. See generally Franck, Baradei & Aron, The New Poor: Land-Locked,
Shelf-Locked, and Other Geographically Disadvantaged States, 7 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 33-57 (1974).
4. Consider, for example, Afghanistan, one of the two dozen "least de-
veloped" States of the world, whose most direct route of access to the sea,
across Pakistan to the port of Karachi, is denied it because of territorial
and political differences with Pakistan.
relative to what other States receive. The countries are "disadvan-
taged" because they have less than other States. The question that
poses itself: at what point, moving on a scale from near zero
to some sort of median or average point for the national attributes
of all coastal States, does one move from a "disadvantaged" to "non-
disadvantaged" status?
A second point is that "disadvantaged" has in the past normally
been used in reference to marine-related activities. But in the con-
text of the Developing World, and the quest of countries for real-
location of wealth, the term tends to take on a broader meaning.
Developing countries are more disadvantaged than the developed
ones, and among the developing, there are at least some efforts to
single out the two dozen or so "least developed" for some special
considerations.
Finally, there is the question of the rationale for the new ethic
of equity being applied with respect to the sea. Throughout his-
tory, nations have possessed unequal resource bases. Some States
had oil, others agricultural land, still others minerals. Geographic
inequity was the rule of international affairs. Add to this the mys-
tique of independence. National areas with little or no economic
viability have opted for freedom from outside rule as separate enti-
ties, rather than in combination with neighbors. In a global system
of approximately 155 States, many units, having chosen inde-
pendence, are in the position of having few potential resources
within their boundaries on which to build a strong economic base.
It is in the world ocean that some of these countries hope, in the
name of equity, to find compensation for the geographic inade-
quacies they experience. But to increasingly "politicize" the ge-
ographically-disadvantaged concept could mean that its viability
with respect to the more "legitimate" claimants may be under-
mined.
CRrEmuA FOR IDETIFYIG GDS
One of the first issues in identifying GDS might be considered
a problem of semantics. Does the term include the land-locked
States or not? The Single Negotiating Text is unclear on this point.
Some references are made to GDS which clearly are meant to in-
clude the land-lockeds. Other references are to "land-locked and
other GDS," and to "land-locked and GDS." There was, at Geneva,
an informal Group of Land-locked and Other Geographically Disad-
vantaged States, which in April, 1975 presented a draft text to the
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Chairman of Comnmittee II, outlining their common position on the
question of the economic zone.5 The issue is not unimportant;
first, because the land-lockeds may come to enjoy special rights not
available to the other GDS, and second, because the land-locked
group includes several developed States, while conceivably the term
GDS may come to apply only to developing countries.
A first set of criteria for identifying GDS involves access to the
sea and its resources. Priority here goes to the land-locked States.
Of the nine land-lockeds in Europe, four are mini-States and the
other five would seem to be in the developed category.6 None of
the land-locked countries of other continents are developed (Table
1). As noted earlier, the land-locked States differ among them-
selves in the difficulties of securing access to the sea. This is true
both because of possible international difficulties with neighboring
countries, and because of inadequacies of transport facilities across
the neighboring (or "Transit") State to the sea, and of port facili-
ties available for the land-locked's use.
7
5. The countries sought the right to participate in the exploration and
exploitation of the living and nonliving resources of the economic zones of
the neighboring coastal State or States, such neighboring States to be adja-
cent to, or situated in the vicinity of, the land-locked or geographically-
disadvantaged State concerned.
6. The United Nations, in distinguishing among countries on the basis
of levels of economic development, omits from the developed/developing
definition the socialist bloc countries. Thus, Czechoslovakia and Hungary,
two of Europe's land-locked States, would not tend to be labelled either
"developed" or "developing." The same would be true for Mongolia, one
of Asia's land-locked countries.
7. An interesting point here is that certain transit States might them-
selves be in a position to claim disadvantage because of the requirement
that they make available transport and harbor facilities to their land-locked
neighbors. Both Tanzania and Zaire, for example, have five contiguous
land-locked States. The situation would be exacerbated for certain transit
States should neighboring land-locked countries have the right to share on
an equitable basis in the exploration and exploitation of the living (and



































A second group of GDS are those with limited coastlines on the
sea (Table 2). Iraq borders the sea for ten miles,8 Jordan for 15,
and Zaire for 22. This means they have little space available for
ports, fishing harbors, beaches, and marinas. It also may mean they
have a corollary disadvantage, namely, a small area of continental
shelf and economic zone. Iraq, Jordan, and Zaire, as shown in
Table 3, have very limited offshore zones. Yet the mid-Pacific
island-State of Nauru, which has only nine miles of coastline, would
be entitled to an economic zone of over 125,000 square miles, since
.no other land area is located near it.
8. All measurements are in nautical miles. One nautical mile equals
1.151 statute miles, or 1.852 kilometers. One square nautical mile equals
1.324 square statute miles, or 3.430 square kilometers.
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TABLE 2
STATES WITH LIMITED COASTLINES









































































If a small coastline is a disadvantage, where then should the cut-
off point be between a "disadvantaged" and nondisadvantaged
State? One could use 100 miles of coastline, 200 miles, or some
greater figure as a limit. The authors have no suggestion for reso-
lution to this point, and note that any decision made on this issue
may be more political in nature than geographic.
A second point is what should be done about Belgium, a devel-
oped country with only 34 miles of coast. Would it be entitled to
any special rights along with the developing States of this category?
A third group of GDS are those coastal States with small conti-
nental margins and/or economic zones. Singapore's potential eco-
nomic zone comes out to 100 square miles,0 fraq's and Jordan's to
200, Zaire's to 300 square miles (Table 3). As noted earlier, some
island States may have short coastlines but extensive economic
zones. The converse is also true. Yugoslavia, for example, has a
relatively long coastline, but would be constricted by the size of
its economic zone in the narrow Adriatic Sea. Once again the twin
questions arise: (1) where would the ,cut-off point be between dis-
advantaged and nondisadvantaged States, and (2) should developed
countries be included among the GDS identified on the basis of
limited-area continental margins and/or economic zones?
TABLE 3
































Still another group are the shelf-locked States (Table 4). Most
share the twin disadvantage of limited size of their continental
shelf/economic zone area, and an absence of outer continental mar-
gin. Within this group, the country with the largest shelf area is
Finland, whose 28,600 square mile shelf places it 30th among the
States of the world in shelf size. Many of the shelf-locked group
are developed States.
9. OFFICE OF =HE GEOGRAPHER, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, THEORETICAL AREAL ALLOCATIONS OF SEABED TO COASTAL
STATES, LTs 3N TmH SEAS (Int'l Boundary Study, Series A, No. 46, Aug.
12, 1972).
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(a) extensive shelf area off coast of overseas possessions
(b) opens on semienclosed sea, a small part of which is deeper than 200
meters
(c) mostly shelf-locked but narrow shelf area also on the open sea
* not member of United Nations
Some countries have fairly extensive offshore margin areas,
and/or could anticipate reasonably large economic zones, but are
faced with what seems to be very limited resource potential therein
(Table 5). At the 1974 Third Law of the Sea session at Caracas,
for example, the representative from Jamaica submitted a proposal
which would allow coastal States to establish economic zones be-
yond the 12-mile territorial sea, but provides that nationals of all
countries of the region should have the right to exploit the living
resources of the extra-territorial waters of the region on a recipro-
cal and preferential basis. A status of disadvantage, resulting from
a shortage of resources in the economic zone, would, of course, be
changed with the discovery of hydrocarbon or manganese nodule
resources within the zone.
TABLE 5
STATES WITH INDICATIONS OF LIMITED RESOURCE










One other possible group of GDS are those States in isolated
oceanic locations, considerably removed from major shipping lanes.
Again, at the Caracas session, there was an indication of this issue.
The representative from Tonga referred to his country as disadvan-
taged on the basis of location (Table 6).
TABLE 6







In addition to matters of access, there are two special forms of
disadvantage, both of them noted in the Single Negotiating Text.
One is the case of States producing minerals and other raw mate-
rials, which may in time be competing with commodities obtained
from seabed mining (Table 7). Chile and Zambia might fall within
this group because of copper, Gabon with respect to manganese,
and Zaire for cobalt. Such States could be expected to seek com-
pensations from any International Seabed Authority for economic
disadvantages suffered as a result of seabed mineral exploitation.
TABLE 7
DEVELOPING STATES PRODUCING MINERALS OR OTHER
RAW MATERIALS WHICH MAY BE AFFECTED BY
COMMODITIES OBTAINED FROM SEABED MINING
COPPER: Chile, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Zaire, Zambia.
CoBALT: Cuba, Morocco, Zaire, Zambia.
MANGANESE: Brazil, Gabon, India, Mexico, South Africa.
NIcKEL: Cuba, Indonesia.
A second item concerns States which are particularly dependent
for the satisfaction of their nutritional needs on the exploitation
of the living resources of the economic zones of other States of the
region. Japan would be a strong candidate for inclusion in this
group, but the Single Negotiating Text, as it now stands, specifies
only developing States as being eligible for consideration (Table
8). The Text also notes that developing coastal States, which can
claim no exclusive economic zones of their own, shall enjoy similar
privileges.
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TABLE 8
DEVELOPING STATES DEPENDENT FOR THE
SATISFACTION OF THEIR NUTRITIONAL NEEDS ON THE
EXPLOITATION OF THE LIVING RESOURCES OF THE





DEVELOPING COASTAL STATES WHICH CAN CLAIM NO





Cutting across the whole spectrum of geographic issues is the
question of levels of economic development. A recent United Na-
tions publication ° lists 24 States as being least developed on the
basis of (1) per capita gross domestic product; (2) share of manu-
facturing in the total gross domestic product, and (3) share of the
literate population in the age group of 15 years or more. In addi-
tion, the survey was concerned with the size of the economy, and
the extent of its stagnation or buoyancy. On the basis of such






























10. Identification of the Least Developed among the Developing Coun-
tries: A Review in Light of Recent Information, U.N. Doc. E/AC.54/L.72
(1975). The report actually listed 25 States, but one, Sikkim, has subse-
quently been incorporated within India.
Two caveats should be noted. First, the survey did not take into
account a number of recently-independent States, one or more of
which might conceivably merit inclusion in the list. These new
States include Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tome e Principe, Papua New
Guinea, Angola, Comoro Island, and Surinam." Second, there are
some developing States very close to inclusion on the list. For ex-
ample, three countries-Botswana, Uganda, and Western Samoa-
were on the 1971 list of the least developed, and were removed only
because they are now slightly better off.
The "multiplier effect" of the disadvantaged is evident here.
Thirteen of the least developed are land-locked States, 11 of
these in Africa, and two in Asia. Botswana and Uganda are also
land-locked. Gambia has only a 38-mile coastline, and a small eco-
nomic zone, while Tanzania is a potential transit State for several
land-locked neighbors.
SPEcIAL RIGHTS FOR Tim GDS, AND FOR DEVELOPING STATES,
AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT
The prospective positions both of the GDS and all developing
States in a future regime of the sea, were singled out in the Single
Negotiating Text which appeared in 1975. What follows are specific
articles in the Text, arranged according to varying criteria. The
roman numeral refers to the part in the Single Negotiating Text,
and the arabic numeral to the particular article. In the case of
part III of the Text, there were a series of sections, each with a
separate numbering system.
EQuALITY OF TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING GDS, INxCLUDING LA=-
LOCKED STATES
III Development and Transfer of Technology-7:
States shall endeavour to ensure that international organizations
competent in the field of the transfer of technology coordinate their
activities in this field, including any regional or international pro-
grammes, taking into account the interests and needs of the devel-
oping States, including land-locked and geographically disadvan-
taged States.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATION FOR ALL LAND-LOcKED STATES
11-57:
Land-locked States shall have the right to participate in the exploi-
tation of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of
adjoining coastal States on an equitable basis .... Developed
11. In addition, other newly-independent States, e.g., Equatorial Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, and Grenada, may not have been considered in the March,
1975 survey.
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land-locked States shall, however, be entitled to exercise their
rights only within the exclusive economic zones of neighboring de-
veloped coastal States.
11-109:
1. Land-locked States shall have the right of access to and from
the sea for the purpose of exercising the rights provided for in the
present Convention. . . . To this end, land-locked States shall en-
joy freedom of transit through the territories of transit States by
all means of transport.
H1-116:
Land-locked States may, in accordance with the provisions of Part
III, participate in the exploitation of the living resources of the ex-
clusive economic zone of adjoining coastal States.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATION FOR DEVELOPING LAND-LOCKED STATES
1-23:
1. In the exercise of its functions, the Authority shall take meas-
ures pursuant to this Convention to promote and encourage activi-
ties in the Area and to secure the maximum financial and other
benefits from them.
2. The Authority shall avoid discrimination in the granting of op-
portunities for such activities .... Special consideration by the
Authority under this Convention for the interests and needs of the
developing countries, and particularly the land-locked among them,
shall not be deemed to be discrimination.
1-27:
1. The Council shall consist of 36 Members of the Authority elected
by the Assembly . . . the election to take place in the following
order:
(b) Six Members from among the developing countries, one be-
ing drawn from each of the following categories:
(iv) Land-locked States.
MI Development and Transfer of Technology-4:
1. In order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives, States ...
shall endeavor to, inter alia:
(a) establish programmes of technical cooperation for the ef-
fective transfer of all kinds of marine technology to the de-
veloping States, particularly the developing land-locked
States ....
SPEcIAL CoNsmERATION FOR GDS, INCLUDING LAnD-LOCKEn STATES
1-9:
1. The development and use of the Area shall be undertaken in
such a manner as to:
(b) avoid or minimize any adverse effects on the revenues and
economies of the developing countries, resulting from a sub-
stantial decline in their export earnings from minerals and
other raw materials originating in their territory which are
also derived from the Area.
1-26:
2. In addition, the powers and functions of the Assembly shall in-
clude:
(xi) Consideration of problems arising from States in con-
nection with activities in the Area, from the land-
locked and otherwise geographically disadvantaged
location of some of them and to recommend basic
guidelines for appropriate action.
1-30:
2. The Economic Planning Commission.. . shall ... make recom-
mendations to the Council on programmes and measures . . . and
in particular:
(b) Appropriate programmes and measures ... to avoid or
minimize adverse effects on developing countries whose
economies substantially depend on the revenues derived
from the export of minerals and other raw materials origi-
nating in their territories which are also derived from the
resources of the Area ....
III-23-Conduct and Promotion of Marine Scientific Research:
1. States and international organizations conducting marine scien-
tific research in the economic zone of a coastal State shall take into
account the interest, and rights of the land-locked and other geo-
graphically disadvantaged States of the region ....
2. Such neighbouring land-locked and other geographically disad-
vantaged States shall, at their request, be given the opportunity to
participate, whenever feasible, in the proposed research project
through qualified experts to be appointed by them.
SPECIAL CoNsIDERATIoN FOR GDS, EXCLUDING LAND-LOCKED STATES
1-27:
1. The Council shall consist of 36 Members of the Authority elected
by the Assembly . . . the election to take place in the following
order:
(b) Six Members from among the developing countries, one be-
ing drawn from each of the following categories:
(v) Geographically disadvantaged States
(vi) Least developed countries.
H1-58:
Developing coastal States which are situated in a subregion or re-
gion whose geographical peculiarities make such States particularly
dependent for the satisfaction of the nutritional needs of their pop-
ulations upon the exploitation of the living resources in the eco-
nomic zones of their neighbouring States and developing coastal
States which can claim no exclusive economic zones of their own
shall have the right to participate, on an equitable basis, in the ex-
ploitation of living resources in the exclusive economic zones of
other States in a subregion or region.
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EQUALITY OF TREATMENT FOR ALL DEVELOPING STATES
111-9 Development and Transfer of Technology:
The International Sea-bed Authority shall... ensure:
(a) that nationals of developing States whether coastal, land-
locked or other geographically disadvantaged, on an equi-
table geographic distribution, be taken on under training as
members of the managerial, research and technical staff
constituted for its undertakings.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATioN FOR ALL DEVELOPING STATES
1-9:
2. Activities in the Area shall be carried out in an efficient manner
to ensure:
(d) Equitable sharing in the benefits derived therefrom, taking
into particular consideration the interests and needs of the
developing countries, whether land-locked or coastal.
I-10:
3. States Parties shall promote international co-operation in scien-
tific research in the Area exclusively for peaceful purposes by:
(b) ensuring that programmes are developed through the Au-
thority for the benefit of developing countries and tech-
nologically less developed countries with a view to:
(i) strengthening their research capabilities;
(ii) training their nationals and the personnel of the Au-
thority in the techniques and applications of research;
(iii) fostering the employment of their qualified personnel
in activities of research in the Area;
1-11:
The Authority and through its State Parties to this Convention
shall take necessary measures for promoting the transfer of tech-
nology and scientific knowledge relating to activities in the Area
so that all States benefit therefrom. In particular, they shall pro-
mote:
(a) Programmes for the promotion of transfer of technology to
developing countries with regard to activities in the Area,
including, inter alia, facilitating the access of developing
countries to patented and non-patented technology, under
just and reasonable conditions;
(b) Measures directed towards the acceleration of domestic
technology of developing countries and the opening of op-
portunities to personnel from developing countries for train-
ing in marine science and technology and their full partici-
pation in activities in the Area.
1-18:
Participation in the activities in the Area of developing countries,
including the land-locked and other geographically disadvantaged
States among them, shall be promoted, having due regard to their
special needs and interests.
1-23:
3. The Authority shall ensure the equitable sharing by States in
the benefits derived from activities in the Area, taking into particu-
lar consideration the interests and needs of the developing countries
whether coastal or land-locked.
1-26:
2. In addition, the powers and functions of the Assembly shall in-
dude:
(x) Adoption of criteria, rules, regulations and procedures, for
the equitable sharing of benefits from the Area and its re-
sources, taking into special account the interests and needs
of the developing countries, whether coastal or land-locked.
11-106:
1. In determining the allowable catch and establishing other con-
servation measures for the living resources in the high seas, States
shall:
(a) adopt measures which are designed.., to maintain or re-
store populations of harvested species at levels which can
produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by rel-
evant environmental and economic factors, including the
special requirements of developing countries ....
IlI-1 Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment:
States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources
pursuant to their environmental policies and they shall, in accord-
ance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environ-
ment, take account of their economic needs and their programmes
for economic development.
111-12 Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment:
Developing States shall, for purposes of the prevention of marine
pollution or the minimization of its effects, be granted preference
in:
(a) the allocation of appropriate funds and technical assistance
facilities of international organizations, and
(b) the utilization of their specialized services.
111-16 Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment:
3. States. . . shall endeavour to establish global and regional rules
standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent,
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-
based sources, taking into account.., the economic capacity of de-
veloping countries and their need for economic development.
111-6 Development and Transfer of Technology:
States, either directly or through appropriate international organi-
zations shall promote the establishment of universally accepted
guidelines, taking into account in particular the interests and needs
of the developing States, for the transfer of marine technology and
other work in the field of transfer of technology on a bilateral basis
or within the framework of international organizations and other
fora.
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In summary, it may be seen that the Single Negotiating Text pro-
vides relatively few real compensations for the GDS. They receive
no priorities in terms of the allocation of funds from seabed mineral
exploitation, although there is the implication that developing
States which produce minerals and other raw materials also origi-
nating from seabed mining could be compensated for economic
losses sustained. Only under very restricted conditions would de-
veloping coastal States be entitled to share in the exploitation of
the living resources of the economic zones of other States of the
region. The GDS and the least developed countries are entitled
to one representative each on the Council, a condition which may
lead to confusion, since many of the land-locked States are also
among the least developed.
The land-lockeds also do not fare too well in the Single Negotiat-
ing Text. As a group, they are entitled to one representative on
the Assembly and they may have special opportunities in the activi-
ties of the Area. But their rights to partake in the exploitation
of the living resources of the economic zones of coastal States are
limited to "adjoining" States, rather than States of the region, a
distinction which may in time cause difficulties.
GEOGRAPHIC INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF THE GDS
The dimensions of the problem inherent in the concept of the
land-locked and other GDS may best be illustrated by their geo-
graphic distribution. Figure 1 depicts the world-wide distribution
of land-locked States. Five of the nine European land-locked coun-
tries form a solid, contiguous block. One, Liechtenstein, is also sur-
rounded by her land-locked neighbors Austria and Switzerland.
Andorra, Vatican City, Luxembourg and San Marino constitute out-
liers of individually land-locked States.
From a different perspective, France is bordered by three land-
locked States-Andorra, Luxembourg and Switzerland. The Fed-
eral Republic of Germany has four land-locked neighbors-Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. The French and
German totals could each be raised by one, depending upon the
resolution of the particular problem of Liechtenstein, which is
joined in a customs union with Switzerland. Italy, in turn, has
four or five land-locked adjacent States-Austria, Vatican City, San
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San Marino and Vatican City may fall into a category by them-
selves in that they abut only one coastal State-Italy.
In the case of Europe, the economic problem of the land-lockeds
is made easier by the short distances to the coastline; the longest
straight-line distance (from the closest border point) is approxi-
mately 200 miles. Furthermore, all of the States bordering the
land-lockeds have excellent infrastructures including ports which
may serve the land-locked communities. Several of the important
river systems, e.g., the Danube, are internationalized by recognized
accords of long standing. On the other hand, many of the coastal
States bordered by land-locked countries-Belgium, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and
possibly Yugoslavia-are in themselves disadvantaged, i.e., they are
shelf-locked or would have very small economic zones.
Five land-locked States lie in Asia: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Laos,
Nepal, and Mongolia. China borders all five of these; India borders
two.
Unlike the situation in Europe, local transportation systems in
Asia, particularly in the border regions, are ill-developed and over-
burdened. In the Asian land-locked States, railroads are all but un-
known, and connections with China, for example, would have to
cross some of the highest mountains of the world. This fact alone
tends to direct the attention of the land-lockeds southward. Po-
litical considerations already alluded to, may override local geo-
graphic factors.
Most of the States adjacent to the land-locked countries, however,
comprise either some of the least developed States in the world
or those which are within the general range. India, with its teem-
ing millions of people and developmental problems, may find itself
hard-pressed to find the resources to assist Nepal and Bhutan. Laos
borders on the war-torn States of North and South Vietnam and
Cambodia. The country, however, has additional coastal neighbors
in Burma, China (as noted) and Thailand.
Two neighboring countries in the Americas-Bolivia and Para-
guay-are land-locked. Bolivia's natural access has historically
been west to the Pacific through Chile and Peru. Negotiations have
been underway for many years to alleviate many of the transporta-
tion problems. Paraguay is more fortunate, being situated on the
navigable Parana with direct access to the harbors of Argentina
and Uruguay.
It is in Africa, however, where the problems of the land-locked
States are most intense. Thirteen land-locked countries exist here,
nearly 45 percent of the world's total. These land-lockeds comprise
over 2.5 million square miles of territory-20 percent of the conti-
nent's total area. As in Europe, large blocs of land-locked States
are encountered: Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, Niger, and
Upper Volta in West Africa; Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda in
Central Africa; and Botswana, Malawi and Zambia in Southern Af-
rica; Lesotho and Swaziland are isolated. The land-locked presence
of Southern Rhodesia further complicates the situation.
As in Europe, several States border many land-lockeds. Tanzania
has five of them as neighbors-Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda,
and Zambia. A railroad, currently under construction, will join
Zambia with the ports of Tanzania. Uganda already has rail con-
nections with Kenya. Chad, situated in the drought-stricken Sahel,
borders on two other land-locked States-Central African Republic
and Niger-and on zone-locked Sudan; it is also isolated to the
north from Libya by the Sahara. Zaire, a very short coastline
country, has five land-locked adjacent States-Burundi, Central
African Republic, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia.
Unlike conditions in Europe, however, distances from coastlines
are generally considerable. Rwanda is more than 600 miles from
the nearest coast, while Burundi is only slightly less. Chad lies
nearly 500 miles inland. To complicate the African picture of land-
locked and geographically-disadvantaged States, 16 of the least de-
veloped States of the world are situated on the same continent.
While ten of these comprise land-locked countries, the remaining
six coastal States, with one exception (Somalia), are adjacent to
one or more of the land-locked countries. The problems of trans-
portation and of sharing of resources are compounded by adjacency.
States with very short coastlines generally are geographically dis-
persed; no continental or regional patterns of distribution are evi-
dent. Furthermore, they are normally situated adjacent to States
with long coastlines and therefore are close to relatively extensive
economic zones. However, several of this group-Bahrain and Iraq,
and Dahomey and Togo-are paired by adjacency. In general, most
very short coastline States fall under other categories of disad-
vantaged. While the various types of attributes of being disadvan-
taged may be combined, some care should be exercised, in any de-
velopment of categories, to insure that geographical interrelation-
ships do not artificially compound the issue, i.e., all very short coast-
line States, by definition, will either have small economic zones or
be shelf-locked.
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Small coastline island States, particularly if they do not lie adja-
cent to other countries or territories, will automatically have large
economic zones. Thus, an insular continental distinction, if the cat-
egory is deemed valid, will have to be made.
The shelf-locked States are also widely dispersed throughout the
world. By their very nature, however, they tend to be regionally
concentrated along the shores of the semienclosed or enclosed seas.
All Baltic Sea States, except the U.S.S.R., for example, are shelf-
locked. As a result, most Baltic countries are in a condition of adja-
cency only with other shelf-locked (i.e., potentially GDS) States.
The same general situation prevails in the Red Sea, the Persian
Gulf and the Gulf of Thailand. How this shelf-locked problem may
be alleviated is difficult to determine within the constraints of ad-
jacency.
The ECOSOC study (E/AC.54/L.72) of least-developed States
identified 24 States in this specific category (Figure 2). The list
includes Haiti in the Americas, the Asian land-locked States, exclud-
ing Mongolia, and a block of African States extending from Malawi
in the south, to Sudan in the north, and from Somalia in the east,
to Senegal in the west. These least-developed countries, however,
were selected from a broader group and the distinctions among all
the less-developed States are very slight. The entire list compiled
in the study is represented on Figure 3. It can easily be seen that
these States constitute several cohesive agglomerations; (1) south
and southeast Asia, and (2) central and eastern Africa. If the more
recently independent States, which were probably not considered
in the study, are added to the area, an even greater intensification
of the concentration occurs. Three of the new countries are African;
one, southeast Asian; and two, Carribbean. The States include
Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome e Principe, Grenada, Papau
New Guinea and Surinam, among others. An examination of the
three maps shows the geographic interrelationship -of the categories
of the GDS. Their adjacency and concentration militate against
any easy solution to their problems. Indeed, it may accomplish
little for GDS to share mutually their status of being geographically
disadvantaged.
One example, perhaps, will illustrate the range of the classifica-
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the 24 least-developed States. It also possesses a very short coast-
line and will potentially receive a small economic zone as a result.
Little interest has been shown in Dahomean offshore petroleum ex-
ploration. The country borders on another least-developed State
(Togo) which also has a very short coastline, and a lesser-developed
State (Nigeria). The status of the latter, however, may be altered
when new GNP figures are released reflecting the increased prices
of petroleum. Notwithstanding, Dahomey has two land-locked
neighbors-Upper Volta and Niger. They, in turn, are bounded by
two additional land-locked countries-Chad and Mali.
The scenario may, of course, be repeated elsewhere although per-
haps not as vividly.
What then is the resolution of the problem? It is difficult to
see how one may arrive at an equitable solution for the GDS with-
out inequity for other adjacent GDS as a consequence of their geo-
graphic propinquity. As noted, the partial problem of the land-
locked States, i.e., access to the sea, may well be met within the
framework of existing international law, treaties, bilateral agree-
ments and the language of the Single Negotiating Text, although
serious problems exist. Access to the sea may, however, involve
great distances, impassable terrain or inhospitable desert. Infra-
structures may not exist even to satisfy the needs of the transit
State.
The problems of access to marine resources, however, appear to
be virtually insurmountable. Direct access to resources through
one preferred neighbor may result in an intensive concentration of
demands on that State, which may itself be geographically disad-
vantaged. Even if not in this category, a coastal State may be hard-
pressed to meet the demands of four or five land-locked or geo-
graphically-disadvantaged neighbors.
The actual problem, hopefully, may not be as great as it poten-
tially appears to be. Certain GDS may not have an interest in the
living resources of an adjacent State's economic zone for either eco-
nomic or political reasons. Other lines of development or of "ac-
cess" may be available which have a greater appeal or which may
be more efficient. However, even if the worst case does not de-
velop, the problems of providing equitable allocations will be enor-
mous due primarily to the geographic concentration of the States.
National solutions do not appear to be able to provide the logical
answer to international problems.
One avenue of approach would appear to parallel the fisheries
policies of the European Economic Community. In essence, a re-
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gional arrangement of States might be able to meet, within national
interest constraints, an essentially regional or international prob-
lem.
A similar solution to the GDS resource-access question may be
possible through regional arrangements within the various existing
regional and subregional organizations of Africa and Latin America.
These arrangements combine States with geographic, historical and/
or cultural bases for cooperation. States may even agree, as in cer-
tain regional organizations, to national specializations within the
regional or economic area which would afford to the GDS a particu-
lar relevance in accordance with its existing resources. Such re-
gional arrangements will be difficult to negotiate and to implement,
but they may, in the long run, offer more rational solutions.
The geographical obstacles, for example, in allocating to Niger
access to the living resources of adjacent States, appear insuperable.
Niger is bound by the coastal States of Algeria, Libya, Dahomey
and Nigeria. Will Niger be granted access to each of the four eco-
nomic zones or will Dahomey be exempt since it too is a GDS?
How would a Niger allocation be divided among the three or four
States? How may Niger gain access across the Sahara to Libyan
and Algerian economic zones? If this right proves too expensive
to exercise, will Niger concentrate its activities only in the zone
of Nigeria? What will happen to the "unused allocations"? Will
Dahomey also have rights in Nigeria's zone? How will these rights
be apportioned among Dahomey, Niger and Nigeria? The answers
seem fraught with potential conflicts creating more problems than
they may actually solve.
Another possibility, of course, is to grant these States financial
aid from the revenues of the international seabed operations. How-
ever, it is not known at present when these revenues will be avail-
able or how significant they may be. Indeed, the potential costs
of the Authority itself are unknown and they will out of necessity
have a prior claim on revenues. Moreover, we have seen a move
by the land-based, and potentially GDS, producers of seabed min-
erals to establish production controls or to determine economic
means to soften the blow, if any, of future deep seabed mineral
production. Controls will inhibit revenues.
It appears obvious that the first problem should be to identify
what is meant by a "geographically-disadvantaged state" in order
to determine the magnitude of the issue. The location, i.e., adja-
cency of these States, must then be determined to ascertain how
the question will be concentrated locally and world-wide. The na-
ture of the disadvantage must further be identified; different types
of disadvantage will most assuredly require different solutions.
The problems of resource access may then be able to be met by
regional and subregional fisheries and development accords. The
problems of the land-based producers may require funding from
the revenue of the international zone, if the economic competition
does produce inequities. Other types of geographical disadvantage
will have to be met by other arrangements. However, until the
problem has been studied and the issues identified, conventional
solutions may prove to be no more than palliatives.
